Geopolitics and Global Hot Spots for the New Administration

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Text, WEDNESDAYS WITH WOODWARD (registered trademark), A WEBINAR SERIES. Geopolitics and Global Hot Spots for the New Administration. Logos, TRAVELERS INSTITUTE, TRAVELERS, PARTNERSHIP for New York City. 

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OK, let's get started. So good afternoon, and thank you so much for joining us today. My name is Joan Woodward, and I'm honored to lead the Travelers Institute, the public policy division and educational arm of the Traveler's Insurance Company. It's great to be back this year with a terrific lineup of speakers, including our fantastic guests today--for our Wednesdays with Woodward series--to explore issues impacting our personal and professional lives in these difficult and really uncertain times. 

We're thrilled to have joined today with the Partnership of New York City to host this program-- so thank you, Kathy Wylde, at the Partnership for that. We're pleased you're here today, and we'll help you stay engaged with us. You can join our mailing list to get all our invitations by emailing institute@travelers.com, or connect with me directly on LinkedIn, or watch replays of our past webinars on TravelersInstitute.org. 

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Linked In Connect: Joan Kois Woodward. hashtag Wednesdays with Woodward. 

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Before we get started, I'd like to share a disclaimer about today's program. 

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Text, About Travelers Institute Webinars. Wednesdays with Woodward is an educational webinar series presented by the Travelers Institute, the public policy division of Travelers. This program is offered for informational and educational purposes only. You should consult with your financial, legal, insurance or other advisors about any practices suggested by this program. Please note that this session is being recorded and may be used as Travelers deems appropriate. 

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Today, we're going to discuss foreign policy issues that the Biden administration will face in the coming years. It's a really interesting time, as everyone knows-- to say the least-- with the world facing ongoing global pandemic, Iran getting closer to producing a nuclear weapon, and the United States-China and the United States-Russia tensions are mounting. 

President Biden is facing many, many challenges, both at home, again, and abroad. Here to help us understand these issues and how the Biden administration can tackle them best is retired Navy Admiral Michael Rogers. 

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Joan Woodward, E.V.P., Public Policy & President, Travelers Institute, MODERATOR. Admiral Michael Rogers (Retired), U.S. Navy; Senior Advisor, Brunswick; Former Commander, U.S. Cyber Command and Former Director, National Security Agency, SPEAKER. 

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It is truly an honor to host Admiral Rogers today. As many of you know, Admiral Rogers has a distinguished, 37 year career in the US Navy, where he rose to the rank of four-star admiral. 

For more than four years, Admiral Rogers served simultaneously as the Commander of the US Cyber Command and Director of the National Security Agency. In these roles, he engaged with the leadership of the US government, the Department of Defense, the US intelligence community, as well as their international counterparts, to address cyber and intelligence issues. In these roles, Admiral Rogers spent countless days--and nights, I'm sure--in the situation room in the White House. 

He's testified before Congress many dozens of times as well. Admiral Rogers currently serves as a Senior Advisor at the Brunswick Group, a strategic advisory firm focused on critical issues at the center of business, politics, and society. In his role in Brunswick, Admiral Rogers focuses on the area of cybersecurity, privacy, geopolitics, technology, intelligence, and crisis management. He holds a Master of Science in National Security from Auburn University and is a distinguished graduate of the Naval War College and is a graduate of the highest distinction from the Naval War College. 

Before I hand it over to Admiral Rogers, a quick note--we'll save time at the end of this program for your audience questions, as we always do. Please don't wait to submit your questions until the end. You can do this any time during our conversation with him. The Q&A function--we're all pretty good with Zoom these days--at the bottom of your screen is where to submit those. And you can check anonymously if you don't want me to read your name. 

So with that, I'm going to turn it over to Admiral Rogers for opening presentation for a little bit--about the state of the world, and his insight into how the Biden administration is expected to approach foreign policy. So Admiral Rogers, thank you so much for your time today, and your insights. And please, go ahead and take it away. 

Thank you, Joan. and to all who are a part of our educational effort today--hey, thank you very much for participating in the series, and for today's particular event at the Traveler's Institute. As you heard--my background, I was a military individual for 37 years as a four star. I found myself working both in the Trump administration and in the Biden administration--excuse me, the Obama administration. So it's interesting to me. I worked with the previous team. 

And the team that President Biden is creating, quite frankly, is filled with people that I worked with as part of the Obama team, from Jake Sullivan as a National Security Advisor, Lloyd Austin as the Secretary of Defense, Tony Blinken at State. Avril Haines is the Director of National Intelligence. So in some ways, I find this personally very interesting. What I thought I'd do is try to set a scene setter for us. 

And what I thought I'd do is--you can't figure out where you're going if you don't know where you've been. So I thought I'd start with--let me talk for a minute about what shaped the last four years, and then let me talk about what I think is shaping the next four years with the new team. And then Joan and I are going to have a discussion about a variety of topics, and then we're going to open up the last 15 minutes, at the end of our time together, for questions from you and the audience. 

So let's start with--boy, where were we four years ago, in January of 2017, when then-new President Trump was coming in. And I think if you look at the last four years, his approach was largely built around several cornerstones. The first was that our allies and our partners were just not carrying their weight, that they had become over reliant and--quite frankly, hiding behind, in his view--the United States and the investments that we had made in defense, our economic strength, the technology, things that we've been able to create as a society. 

He just felt that, bottom line, many of our allies and friends just hadn't been carrying their weight. The second thing I thought was important as he came in--he believed that the global institutions and many of the mechanisms that we, the United States, have helped to create following the Second World War to try to ensure stability, economic prosperity, and forestall conflict--President Trump believed that many of those global institutions and those mechanisms that had been put in place just didn't benefit the US anymore that. 

They, in fact, were being used by others to gain advantage against us. The third thing I thought was a touchstone for President Trump and his team as they assumed that their duties four years ago, he really believed that too often the US, and by extension the world, had turned to the US military, and had placed that military in either no-win or open-ended commitments. And they also had put that US military in places where we, the US, were shouldering the burden for others. That really bothered him. 

Number four, he felt very strongly--remember, he was an outsider. He had never held political office. He had never worked in government. The fourth thing I would highlight for him and his team- he felt very strongly that it was the US government's own institutions and its own structures that were part of the problem. He just felt there was too much bias within the structure, too much resistance to an alternative viewpoint. 

Number five--boy, he used to tell you this all the time. He believed strongly that his predecessors didn't know how to cut a deal, that they often not only couldn't cut a deal, but they often made poor deals. So think about four years ago--his initial approach with China and North Korea, for example, where he said Xi Jinping, Kim Jong-un, they haven't dealt with someone like me. Don't worry, I'll get us a good deal. 

You know, they just haven't dealt with somebody who comes from the business sector, who knows about the bottom line, who focuses on outcomes, and quite frankly, who knows to cut deals. He also viewed some of the deals--if you were--that his predecessors had created with great skepticism. He didn't--and you saw the decision, ultimately, to remove ourselves from the nuclear deal with Iran, JCPOA, the joint-- J-C-P-O-A. He thought it was a flawed deal. 

He didn't like the Paris Peace Accord. He thought that was a poor deal. He didn't like the Trans-Pacific Partnership trade deal. So he came in with this healthy skepticism about a lot of agreements, if you will, that his predecessors had made. And he felt strongly that he was going to be able to create agreements where his predecessors had failed--particularly think about China, think about North Korea, and in some ways Russia. 

The sixth thing I think is important when you look back--President Trump felt very strongly that the US is actually stronger than it's often given credit for in a lot of quarters. And he felt that because we're strong, we can pursue unilateral policies with a high probability of success. He really believed that, quite frankly, our inherent advantages in the ability to compete, in innovation--he felt, hey, look, if we can just get out-- if the government can just get out of the way, the private sector will really show what it's capable of doing. 

And so we shouldn't feel that we cannot act unilaterally--we, the United States. The last thing I'd highlight was--and this was a change. If you look at the first 18 months he was in the job- again, I was part of the team, dealt with him and the leadership of the team all the time. He felt, initially--again, that he could cut a deal with China, that he could create a different dynamic in the relationship. And that lasted for about 18 months. 

But after about 18 months, he came to the conclusion China has taken advantage of the broader global community. It hasn't adhered to accepted norms of behavior. It's got poor trade practices. Its currency manipulation is unfair. Its prohibitions against US and foreign business operating in China is designed to stop us from competing and lock us out of that market. He viewed human rights, really, through the prism of Hong Kong with China. He didn't talk much about the Uyghurs, but he definitely viewed the Hong Kong piece in that. 

And so he came into office four years ago with a very different approach, so how did that play out? He tended not to be as supportive of alliances and many of our traditional partners. He did not support--and in many cases, actually had us withdraw from global institutions, and many of those structures that have been put in place. He militarily withdrew, which significantly brought down our force levels in Afghanistan and Iraq, Syria. 

And he often did it unilaterally. In many instances, we were in those places as part of a broader, global effort with the NATO alliance and with other partners, and yet he decided--he felt strongly enough, he unilaterally drew us down in those areas. He tended to view China through the prism of technology and trade. And the levers he pulled, vis-a-vis China, were largely focused on technology and trade. 

And he felt strongly that we were strong, and we should be prepared to go--to hold China accountable and to do it unilaterally. So that really has shaped the last four years from a foreign policy perspective. He has stayed--I mean, whatever your views--he did stay very consistent with those views. He didn't alter them much. I would argue China, probably, was the biggest pivot for him. But overall, he was very consistent in four years. 

The last thing I thought that was very interesting about President Trump-- he came in, and he would tell you, I'm here for eight years. And he, in his mind, had an eight year time frame for many of the things that he wanted to do. Now, let's pivot. It's January of 2021. Four years later, we've had an election, we've elected a new president. President Trump is no longer the President of the United States, and Joseph Biden has assumed the presidency. 

So the first thing I would point out, I don't think President Biden thinks about an eight year time frame. I think he's thinking about a four year time frame, just given his age and where he is. It'll be interesting to see how that plays out in terms of some of the policy choices he makes. Having worked as a senior member of the military for a long time, it is interesting to see how political leaders, when they think they have longer time frames, will often defer some things to that--what they believe to be their second or final term. 

I'm not sure that that's true with the Biden team. It'll be interesting how that plays out. But President Biden assumes his role with a very different world view. Unlike President Trump, who had never held office, who had never been part of government, Joseph Biden is an individual who has literally spent his adult life in government. He is very familiar with its institutions, with its processes, with its structure. 

He's very comfortable with that. He feels that those structures, those processes, those institutions, are in fact sources of strength, that they are advantages that we should feel free to use. He also--particularly, given his time, eight years as the vice president, as well as his time in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee--arguably, he is the most prepared President from a foreign policy perspective, certainly, we've had in the last century almost. And he feels very strongly about the value of these institutions. 

So the first point I would make, as you're thinking about what's going to shape the Biden team and the choices they're going to make in the next four years--number one, you are going to hear--you're already hearing Jake Sullivan, the National Security Advisor, trumpet this all the time. That team argues you cannot view the domestic peace and the foreign peace as totally unrelated and totally separate. They are inherently intertwined. And therefore, they talk about how their approach is going to focus on both areas. 

And they're going to use each to support the other. The second thing I would argue is the Biden team comes in with a very well defined and a very repeatedly articulated set of immediate priorities. Number one, COVID-19 response, number two, righten the economy, and number three, address the internal issues, if you will, that have kept us apart as a nation--think about social injustice, think about racial inequality, think about this increasing gap in our society between those of wealth and those who are not of wealth. 

So those three things, I think, are going to shape much of his immediate time. So one of the implications of that to me, from a foreign policy perspective, is I am not expecting massive, significant foreign policy breakthroughs in the first six months. I just think his focus is not in that area. It doesn't mean we're not going to do things, but I think you're going to find later in the year, and later in this administration, where much of that is going to start to come to the fore. 

He is also significantly different in that his default is a multilateral, global approach to problem solving. That's where he starts. He does not start from a we're strong, we can do this unilaterally, or that others somehow are taking advantage of us. That is not the view that he maintains. He's going to--but very much, given that focus on rebuilding alliances and relationships very early. You're seeing some of that already--rejoining the Paris Peace Accords, his comments about the importance of NATO and the value of our foreign relationships, not just in Europe, but in Asia--Japan, Korea. 

You're also going to see him, I think, talk about--we need to broaden our criteria we use when making foreign policy decisions. What do I mean by that? You did not see the Trump administration very often use human rights or climate as core criteria when assessing foreign policy choices with issues of other nations. So you saw us do some things with nations and partners who have some significant climate and foreign policy issues--excuse me, significant climate and human rights issues, for example. 

I expect President Biden to be fundamentally different in that regard. I think he views climate and human rights as a core aspect of a nation's foreign policy. And he believes that those issues should be viewed when making assessments about both challenges with potential adversaries, but also what we're going to do with other friends and allies. I think he views them as really important. 

I think another area that's going to be very important is--as I said, President Trump had a healthy skepticism about the institutions and individuals in government writ large. President Biden comes from, again, a totally different perspective. He's been a part of that structure almost his entire adult life. His view is these are hard working men and women. They do great things for our nation. Those institutions, those norms of behavior, those processes that our government has developed over the decades are in fact strengths for us. 

So look at who he has brought in. They are almost all people with previous government experience, who have been a part of these structures, who understand how to use these structures to generate outcomes, a very different approach than President Trump, for example. I also think you're going to see President Biden talking as much about areas that we can work together with others as you will hear him talking about areas where we have fundamental differences. 

So think about--again, issues like cybersecurity, think about COVID-19, in terms of it's an issue that's impacting the whole world. Think about human rights. As I said, think about climate. Think about efforts to combat terrorism, nuclear efforts. His administration has just announced they are going to sign the extension of the START Treaty, for example, with the Russians. He didn't come in and say, the Russians are bad. Everything they're doing is bad. Therefore, we're not going to communicate with them. 

We're not going to coordinate. We're not going to potentially cooperate. He does not view this as a one size fits all. Again, that's a little different than what you saw for the last four years. And then the last issue I highlight before we get into the core issues that Joan and I are going to talk about--the specifics--and then we'll open it up to questions. There are also a lot of-- there are some areas where there will be similarities. 

He too--President Biden believes that China needs to be held accountable. He too believes that now is the time to stand up to China and to address this fundamental unwillingness to adhere to the norms of behavior that have broadly led to less conflict in the world and greater prosperity over the last 75 years. So there will be some differences. But there will be some similarities. 

And with that, Joan, let me turn it back to you. And let's get into some specific topic areas. 

OK, well--Admiral, that was just fantastic for a quick overview of where we were with the Trump administration, and how you expect Biden to on a macro level attack foreign policy. And I think you're correct in pointing out to everyone that Joe Biden has been in Washington for a very long time, and chaired the Foreign Relations Committee. I'm sure you know him quite well after many years of testifying and working with him. So we appreciate your perspective, and thanks again. 

So let's dive in. I'd like to--the way we're going to kind of do this, and the Admiral graciously agreed, is I'm going to throw out different countries. And so we're going to do a whirlwind around the world, talking about North Korea, China, Iran, South China Sea issues, Russia, Europe, NATO. And so we're going to do a kind of rapid fire, and then we're going to take some of your questions. So again, please feel free to drop your questions in the Q&A function. I see some are coming in already, so that's terrific. 

So for each of these countries that we're going to talk about, I'm going to ask you to share your thoughts. One, what is the state of the relationship post-Trump. Two, what are the major concerns or opportunities-- so we could talk about potential opportunities with these countries, especially in the economic front. And how should President Biden address these issues? Based on your knowledge of him and of his multilateralism, what do you expect him to do--kind of first, second, and third. 

So you briefly touched on China, but I want to get back to it first. So China is arguably the most pressing issue that Biden really has to address. The Trump administration really burned a lot of bridges in terms of trade wars. Do we expect that the Biden administration to come in and overturn? He hasn't yet-- but overturn some of the tariffs that were put in place, or take maybe more of a harder line with China? Or do we expect him to take a softer line than what we saw under President Trump--so China's first. 

OK, first--OK, so I do agree. I would argue China is probably the greatest strategic issue of the coming decades, because it's interesting. We have dealt with other nations who we had political and military differences with. I would argue the challenge with the Soviets was largely a military and a political one. We have never really had to deal before--in the post-World War II era, the modern era, if you will, of US foreign policy. 

We have never had to deal with another nation who was a potential adversary or competitor, who had not just political and military power, but who also brought an economic dimension to it. So I highlight that because a lot of times, I'll hear this--are we in a Cold War with China? And I hate the Cold War analogy, because my view is the Cold War was a 45 year ideological struggle between two nations--one of whom, the Soviet Union, actually argued on ideological lines that the long term goal for them was the destruction of capitalism and the overthrow of the governments and the institutions of the West. 

We used a single strategy--containment, if you will--to shape 45 years of practices that ultimately led to the Soviet Union imploding because it couldn't compete economically, and it then fractured politically. I don't see the situation with China in those same lights at all. This is not an ideological struggle. China is a communist nation, but you don't hear the Chinese leadership trumpeting about how their view is they want to extend communism around the world. 

Their view is that communism's gain must inherently lead to the destruction and the overthrow--the loss of capitalism, as it were. They also bring an economic heft to this. We are not going to break--the Chinese are not going to be broken economically, which, in turn, potentially could lead to a political breakup. I just don't think that's realistic. I also don't think a single strategy, containment , is a good strategy vis-a-vis China. 

I also am one who does not view China as an inherent adversary. I view them as a competitor. And I'm concerned that if we don't get this relationship on a better track, it's going to lead to a situation where we are just forever--forever, some period to be defined--view each other as not just competitors, as adversaries. Look, as capitalists, as Americans, we are taught from the day we are born, literally, that competition is a good thing. 

It brings out the best in people. It makes you stronger and it leads to better outcomes. So I embrace the idea of competition. I don't view competing with China as a negative. The challenge has been, how do we compete on a level playing field--because the playing field is not level right now. 

And number two, even as China grows politically, economically, militarily, as China assumes a regional and increasingly global leadership levels, how do we convince the Chinese that the structures that have been put in place for the last 75 years, and the conflict resolution mechanisms that we've created that have led to this massive economic growth, broadly around the world, that have led to lower levels of conflict than the world historically has seen, that those are good things that China should embrace. 

Because right now, China doesn't really embrace them. It uses them to its advantage, and it disregards those that it doesn't like--so take a look at the South China Sea, court territorial cases that have ruled against China's claims that they own the South China Sea, for example. So my view is that the Trump team focused on two primary levers, trade and technology. I think we need to think more broadly than that. 

Secondly, the Trump team tend to tended to view--because we are strong and because our advantages are in innovation and the ability to compete, that in some ways our strategy should be, let's isolate China from the broader world. So if you look at our technology policy--5G, semiconductor chips, the things that we have done in the last couple of years. In many ways, it was in part designed to forestall China's ability to plug into the global system. 

The Biden team fundamentally believes that it's in the best interest to keep China plugged into the global system, that by keeping them a part of that, you in fact will dampen some of these policy swings that you might see. It'll be interesting to see how that plays out. Bottom line, I believe that the Biden administration continues to believe that China has not adhered to the acceptable norms of behavior, that China must be confronted, that the best way to do this is with a global, multilateral approach, that we need to expand our criteria we use to assess China beyond just trade and technology. 

And that even as we're doing that, there are going to be areas where we can work together with the Chinese. COVID is a great example, I think. 

Well, OK, that really is, that is insightful--so I have a couple of follow ups for you. So as you probably well know, within five or six years China will overtake the United States as having the largest economy, the biggest GDP of any country in the world--and that will be the first time ever that the United States was not number one on the GDP list. And so, you know--we got one of the questions that just came in. And I'm going to ask it now, because it's so relevant. 

We--the insurance industry--actually are a GDP driven industry. We are reliant on having more people working, more trucks on the road. We want the economy to be booming, right. So do you expect the Biden administration can enact trade policies to help with our exports and imports? We'll see more economic activity with China--because, as you know, the Trump tariffs really threw the relationship off kilter. And as you say, the playing field is not level, currently, with the Chinese. 

And so what are your thoughts around exports, imports, economic activity? Are we going to get back into some of these trade deals? 

So again, look at that second priority I said that the Biden team has, and that is get the economy back on track. I also said, remember, the Biden team views the domestic and the foreign as interlinked. So I look for trade policy to be a significant component of a Biden strategy for economic recovery. I also think that the Biden team views trade policy as not just an economic lever, but also a strategic lever, which is something that the Trump team did not. 

They would just look at a deal, and look at it from an economic perspective in many instances. The Biden team, I think, looks at deals--if you will--not just from the economic piece, but also from the geopolitical piece. And it says to itself, a trade deal not only is an economic lever, but it's a tool that we can use to bring nations together to develop coherent, global approaches. I just think they're going to look at trade a little differently. 

The other thing I always tell people to keep in mind about the US-China dynamic--right now, we've got two fundamental things going for us. The leadership on both sides--at the moment, at least--does not want open conflict. And number two, the leadership on both sides at the moment--even the Chinese, I would argue--still calculate that they need each other. If either of those two dynamics changes--one of the sides believes they don't need the other anymore, or one of the sides comes to the conclusion that you know, conflict might not be such a bad thing. 

And I don't just mean military conflict. I mean conflict in a broader definition. If those two brakes, if you will--and I mean B-R-A-K-E-- if those two breaks, or inhibitors go away, the dynamic could really change. And it could get much worse. I also am not one who wants to paint China as 10 feet tall. They're going to be the number one economy by GDP. But if you look at their average income for their citizens, they're never going to match--at least for decades--where the US is. 

We have so much more, as a whole, disposable income spread across our society, at a level--where the population, at 1.2 billion, is not going to be true for China. Secondly, China's got massive corruption issues, massive environmental issues. In many ways, they remind me of where America was in the 1960s and the 1970s. I mean, they may have powered this economic growth through industrial capacity, largely manufacturing. 

And much of that manufacturing has—you know, look at their air, look at their water. We were in the same boat 50 years ago, and look at the pivot we made. Lastly, and I agree strongly with one of the comments by the audience, China is Japan with 1.2 billion people. What do I mean by that? It's demographics are so out of whack, because of decades, for example, of this one child policy, because it has aged as a society. 

Their demographics are just not good at all. They have this huge age bubble that is going to only increase the social burdens that they're going to have to deal with. And culturally, they're very focused on support to the elderly, much more so than the cultural norms in our society, for example. Because of this one child policy, for example, that went on for so many decades, their workforce demographic is not where it needs to be for a growing economy. And quite frankly, you don't have people immigrating to China. 

So the primary source that--most nations, if their own demographics are screwed up, they tend to bring in immigration. That's never been the Chinese model. It's a society that doesn't like historically massive amounts of immigration. In fact, it is the most consolidated ethnicity of any major nation in the world. It is, like, 92% Han. I mean, it is--it has a totally different demographic. And I think those are going to present some really significant challenges for them. 

Yeah, and I think those two points--the one child policy and the demographics, of just having the 92%-- people don't realize that, right, in the United States, because we're a nation of immigration. And so that does bring some challenges for them. 

OK, so we're going to leave China and get on our plane. And we're going to fly over to Russia. And as you know well, Putin has tightened his grip on Russia and the Russian people. You ran Cyber Command for over four years. You were the Chief Cybersecurity Officer for the country. And so we have to ask you about SolarWinds, which is the largest hack--cyber hack--we've seen globally. It also attacked our institutions of government. 

So over 250 federal agencies and businesses, as you know, were attacked with SolarWinds by the Russians-- assuming they were behind it. It seems like they were. How do you think about--first, is there a military threat from Russia? Two, you mentioned that Biden already had an olive leaf branch go out to Putin--but three, how are you thinking about them geopolitically, because Trump really had a different view of Russia, foreign policy, than, obviously, you said Biden will. 

So first of all, you know, what is the Russian goal? I believe that Putin doesn't think--he doesn't think about the Communist past. He thinks about the imperial past, and the czarist era. His objective, in my mind, is he wants Russia to be strategically relevant on a global stage. He wants the other nations of the world to have to consider Russia in almost every major foreign policy or geopolitical move they make. He wants Russia to be relevant again. He wants it to be respected. 

And he wants it--he doesn't want it to be taken for granted. And he doesn't want it viewed as a weak sister. And that's what really got him--go back 15 years ago, before he really started getting into--in his early political career, he really felt that the West and the US in particular just stomped all over them because they were weak, took them for granted, and took advantage of them, the Russians. He wants to ensure that doesn't happen again. 

So he realizes that economically--and again, from a demographic perspective, they are the only major industrial nation in the world whose population is decreasing. Their demographics are terrible. They've got the lowest life expectancy of any major industrialized nation in the world. They got diseases in Russia that have been eradicated almost everywhere else in the world still there--polio, chicken pox. 

So they're just not in a great, strong position. They're also an economic entity that is largely shaped by one market, hydrocarbons. And if you look at the market for hydrocarbons, it isn't trending in-- hydrocarbons are the energy building block of the future. That's not the way most nations around the world are going. I'm not arguing that oil and natural gas aren't going to be important. But if you're betting on a commodity to power your economic growth for the next 50 years, that surely wouldn't be one that I would pick. 

So they're playing from a weak hand--the further down the road you go, the weaker their hand gets. So Biden, I think, views himself as a person who has a narrow window--I would argue probably a decade or so--to try to make Russia more relevant. And he is decided that the way to do that is to insert themselves into a lot of issues that, traditionally, they weren't necessarily major players--and think about Syria, think about the Middle East, that he needs to be strong against NATO expansion. 

The whole reason the Russians invaded the Crimea and went into the Ukraine was that in their view, the Ukraine was looking at potentially becoming a NATO member. And a NATO alliance presence on their immediate border, over and above the Baltic states--which they had to accept--that they weren't going to allow anything further along those lines. That was the whole thing that shaped the Ukraine. They wanted to forestall a NATO presence on their border in the south. 

So look at what he's turned to. He knows he can't compete economically, head to head, with the US and the broader world. He knows his one economic strength is energy. So he is using energy, for example, to keep the Europeans at bay, because he knows if you're in Germany--hey, your natural gas is flowing from pipelines originating out of Russia. And you need that energy for those cold winters. He also knows that he's not going to become an economic or a military competitor to the US across the board. 

He's not going to go back to the Cold War, where he's going to create this massive military. If you look at the military investments he's making, he is focusing on a handful of core capabilities that he thinks gives him advantage over the West. He's not trying to match the West tank for tank, gun for gun. Instead, look at what he's investing in. He's investing in cyber. He's investing in disinformation. He's investing in advanced nuclear capabilities. 

If you watch the Russians, for example, they are going back to nuclear policies that were rejected by the world 50 years ago. He actually- his team actually argues, for example, that you can employ nuclear weapons in a tactical level and not trigger a massive response threshold from the West. You know, we went through that cycle in the '60s, and arguably in the '70s and in the '50s. And then we walked away from it. 

We said, look, any nuclear exchange is going to lead to a strategic exchange that is going to end up destroying much of the infrastructure and much of the major elements of our respective societies. You don't want to go down the nuclear road. But look at the money he's putting in the nuclear capabilities. And they are nuclear capabilities designed to evade our ballistic missile defense. Their nuclear capability is designed to be able to react very quickly. 

So bottom line, when I look at Russia, he's playing to the few strengths that he has. I think you have to give him credit. He has been effective. He has tried, through disinformation, to keep America weak, to keep us internally focused at each other--by being strong, if you will, in responding to Russian efforts elsewhere around the world. You look at what they did in the 2016 election. You look at the information, disinformation efforts they've done. You look at their use of cyber. 

The two biggest cyber incidents in world history--2017, NotPetya, the Russians use cyber as a tool designed to impact infrastructure in the Ukraine, except the method they use--a supply chain attack, much like SolarWinds. The method they use ends up proliferating around the world. And it was a destructive attack. And the monetary impact, globally, depending on what figure you want to use, was anywhere from tens to hundreds of billions of dollars. 

Fast forward to 2020, and they execute another supply chain attack--same tactic, except this time it's not destructive. It's--we're going to use this as a vehicle to penetrate systems that are within government institutions in the US and elsewhere, that are within academic institutions, that are within information technology companies. We're going to use that to penetrate those systems and then extract a massive amount of information. And that information is going to give us competitive advantage against the Americans. 

And that's really what--and others around the world. And that's really what SolarWinds was about. So I think the answer, if I was President Biden and his team, is number one, I do believe there are areas that we can cooperate with each other. I do believe that extending the START Treaty five more years to 2026, which controls a number of bombers, submarine launch, ballistic missiles, strategic delivery systems, et cetera, in the nuclear world. I thought that was a smart move. 

By the same token, and even as we're cooperating, I think we need to up the pressure. And the way I would up the pressure is I would identify the key institutions and individuals around Putin that are actually at the heart of his support. Putin is running a kleptocracy. He has turned Russia into this corrupt entity. You're seeing that backlash against corruption, for example, play out in the last two weekends in all of Russia's 11 time zones, in over 120 cities, on the 23rd and the 31st of January. 

You had demonstrations that included tens of thousands of people--now, not hundreds of thousands, and not millions. But you have to acknowledge Putin's popularity is declining compared to where it was two years ago. Personal income is really falling in Russia. COVID response has been terrible. Personal freedoms continue to be compressed. Putin's got some internal issues. I don't think he's going to fall, if you will, in part because Russia culturally is a nation that views suffering as quite the norm, and it has never had a history of overthrowing internally. 

Now, you could argue that the revolution in 1917 is probably the one exception. Most of political change in Russia has been within the party in control. It hasn't normally been driven by external factors so much. 

OK we, are going to have to leave it at that. We have to get on our plane and go to the next country. I have a really quick follow up on Russia, very quick. So I take it that you would not want to get the Russian made COVID vaccine, correct--you won't be having that one? 

I would not. Now, it's an interesting example--I would, because I think health is a good thing. I wouldn't necessarily pursue it for us. But--because I think we have access to capacity. But on the other hand, helping other nations to get vaccines from Russia or other locations, I would not reject that out of hand. 

OK, OK. All right, we're on our plane and we're landing in Pyongyang, North Korea, who has been obviously growing their nuclear arsenal. And frequent missile tests have really been cause for great concern. As you say, you know, President Trump famously pursued direct talks--the first president in the United States history to meet with a North Korean dictator. I believe also--and maybe you can comment on this, that Trump actually showed the leader inside of his car--inside of The Beast, as they call the presidential limo. 

I'm not sure what that was about, maybe you can comment on that. But where do you see the Biden administration--where do you see him taking this. Biden has been intimately involved in understanding Kim Jong-un, Kim Jong-il's strategies. So where is this headed with Biden? 

So first of all, I don't expect President Biden to be meeting personally with Kim Jong-un. I just--I don't see that as--he'll repeat that. It's interesting. Our stated objective with North Korea to date has been to stop them from developing nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them at long distance--really, think about ICBMs, those Intercontinental ballistic missiles that enable them to put a nuclear warhead and deliver it to the United States, for example. 

I think you have to acknowledge that set of policies has failed. We have a North Korea that has nuclear weapons. We have a North Korea that has developed delivery systems. Now, you can get into an argument about--are they accurate enough, are they reliable enough, will they actually reenter safely? I wouldn't want to hedge my strategy around, well, don't worry, they're all going to fail. And they've gone further. They just showed a new submarine launched ballistic missile that they've created. 

We have been aware that they've been developing this for some years. It appears that they have actually at least developed an initial capability. So I think the question then becomes, does the objective still focus on getting them to stop further development? Does the objective become--we not only want you to stop further development, but we want you to give up the nuclear capabilities that you have? 

I don't see North Korea under a Kim Jong-un giving up their nuclear weapons. I think KJU believes that it is his nuclear capability that is forestalling the Americans from removing him from power. KJU's team always used to use Gaddafi and Libya as the example. He said, look, Gaddafi had a nuclear program, and then he gave it up. And look what happened to him. He got overthrown and removed, and NATO and the US inserted themselves into Libya. 

His take away always was, that is a bad example to follow. I, KJU, am never going down that road. I am not going to give up my weapons. I think the best we can hope for, right now, is can we continue to isolate them? Can we potentially convince them that going any further down this road is a bad choice? The last comment I would make is--to me, China has always been the key here. The reality is we have very little leverage over North Korea. They're the most isolated society in the world. They have been, literally, for decades. 

So it's hard to bring external pressure to bear on them, because quite frankly, they're not set up as an economy that has been fully integrated in the global economic structure. They don't have a lot of travel and tourism. They do not get a lot of funds coming from foreign investment. They're an internally, domestically driven economy. They built a structure that can withstand isolation. The only nation to me that has leverage there is China. They need China's energy support. They need China's economic support. 

To date, China has been unwilling to go down that road. The Chinese have always believed-- better the devil you know than the removal of KJU, a unified Korean Peninsula with a South Korean nation that extends all the way to the Yalu River and the Chinese border, with the potential for US forces to continue to be stationed in Korea on that border, as it were. That was always the Chinese biggest fear. And they thought KJU and the North Korean government is bad, but it's better than the alternatives. 

And so they just would not really pressure them significantly. If we can't change that dynamic, I think we're stuck in the status quo, absent KJU being overthrown, KJU dying of natural causes. I just don't see many great alternatives here. 

OK, all right. Well, we'll leave it at that on North Korea. So speaking of enriching uranium and nuclear deals, let's go to Iran. And recently, Iran resumed enriching uranium to 20%, which is enough for nuclear fuel reactors, but also bombs. And Trump took us out of that 2015 nuclear deal. Biden, I assume, is getting us back in. Are we going to renegotiate it? Are you concerned? Is Iran kind of your number two concern, globally, for the Biden administration? 

I tell you-- I always hated numbering them, because my view is that leads to a linear thought that says, this is how I ought to focus. My view was, look, we need to identify one or two key things, but then we've got to be flexible. The reality is the outside world gets a vote. It doesn't matter what your priorities are, in some ways. They're-- the other side's always going to get a vote. So I was always leery about it--are they number two, are they number four, are they number 10? 

There is no doubt they are a long term challenge for us. What makes them, interesting is--number one, Trump's belief was that you had to look at Iran as a whole. You could not separate their nuclear development efforts from their support to terrorism around the world, to their use of surrogates like the Houthis in Yemen, like groups in Iraq, like groups in Syria--their use of surrogates, if you will, to overthrow governments, many of which are our friends and allies. 

Trump argued you got to--you cannot isolate these. So why did you go into a nuclear agreement that actually gave them money back--because remember, as part of the nuclear agreement, the signatories, and it's not just the US,  that was an agreement that all five members of the UN Security Council signed, as well as the EU. And so it was more than just us. The argument that Trump made was the deal gave them--it unlocked all that funding. 

So suddenly, you get billions of dollars pouring back into Iran, which only strengthens their use of surrogates, and only strengthens their commitment to terrorism. Hey, we've got to stop this. The Obama team's view, and I think the Biden team's view was--hey, look, there's no way Iran is going to agree to one structure, one agreement, that addresses every issue where the United States has a disagreement with Iran. 

What we--Obama and I believe--Trump will- excuse me, what Obama and I believe Biden will argue. This is what Obama did argue. We need to get the nuclear issue off the table, get that development frozen, so we can continue to put additional pressure on Iran to address their support to terrorism and their use of surrogates. Having said that, if you look at what has changed with Iran in the last four years--so the US has acknowledged we assassinated Soleimani, one of the leader of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, and one of the primary advocates within the Iranian structure for use of surrogates and support of terrorism. 

The Iranian economy continues to be bad. What led the Iranians to the agreement in 2015 was the moderates made the argument with the clerics--the economy has gotten to the point where it is impacting the quality of life and the economic well-being of our citizens to such a level that if we can't get the economy stabilized, we're going to lose the population, and they are going to rise up against the clerics and against the whole Islamic revolution. 

Therefore, let's take the nuclear piece off the table. Let's get the money. Let's let the sanctions lift. We can continue to work on the other areas, but we have got to ensure we have the population with us. In the six years now since the agreement was signed, the economic situation has only gotten worse. But at the same time, when the Americans withdrew from the agreement under President Trump, it totally undercut all of the moderates in Iran, because what the radicals--what the clerics said was, this shows you. 

You cannot reach an agreement with the Americans. You cannot count on these people, because they tend to change. Unlike our society, our political system, which has been stable over time-- since the Revolution in the '70s. Hey, the Americans change administrations. They zig zag in their geopolitical views. You cannot trust them to make long term agreements and to stick to them. 

Combine that with the Soleimani assassination, the assassination of the Iranian nuclear scientists last year--the idea that we're just going to go back to the old agreement on the nuclear side, I don't think is realistic. 

I think the Iranians are going to want to say, you've got to show us something a little bit more. 

OK, so definitely work to be done there with the Biden folks. OK, there's so many other countries I want to take us to. But we're going to have a time one more stop on our global tour, and we're going to get to your questions. So the stop we're going to make is in the Mideast--and specifically, talk about Israel. You know, Trump leaves office, having stepped up support for the Israelis, and moved the embassy-- the US embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. 

What do you expect with Biden's relationship with Israel, and maybe specifically his approach to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict there? 

So I don't think the relationship will have the same dynamics of the last four years. Why do I say that? The Trump team largely bypassed the Palestinian question. It supported--Netanyahu has increasingly pivoted to this idea that the two state solution, which has literally been the foundation of US foreign policy vis-a-vis Israel and the Palestinians since the '67 war--Netanyahu argued, and the Trump team supported the idea, that the two state solution wasn't necessarily the best approach. 

And so under Netanyahu, you saw the Israelis--more settlements on land that had been historically considered a potential part of that two state solution, were you to carve out a formal Palestinian state. I think the Biden team will be much more focused on--wait a second, our policy with Israel cannot ignore the Palestinian piece. It cannot ignore the human rights issues, that it has to account for that, that a two state approach remains fundamentally the right one. 

I think the Biden team feels strongly on that. By the same token, I don't think you're going to see the Biden team stand up and say, in the first 60 days in office, I'm going to move the US embassy out of Jerusalem. I don't see that happening. I think that decision's been made. And the view is, we don't need to pour more fuel on this fire. It's been done. Let's leave it alone. Let's focus on other things. 

The Trump team also was able to get Israel to relationships, formal treaty recognition from Arab states, from UAE, Bahrain, which nobody had been capable of doing before. One of the ways they're able to do that was, quite frankly, for example, the Trump team was willing to sell arms to UAE and to others if they were willing to support Israel. I don't think President Biden and his team are going to have the same approach with arms deals, for example, in the region at all. 

OK, all right, this has been an amazing ride around the world with you. And now, we're going to get to your audience questions. We have so many coming in--so a lot of them we've kind of answered already, but there's a couple here that I think are interesting. So you've been in the situation room, Admiral Rogers, many, many times, days and nights. We won't ask you how many here, but what's it really like walking into the White House, knowing you're in charge of this portfolio of issues for the country. 

Clearly, you know--thank you for your public service. But what's it really like being in the situation room? 

So first of all, I'm only speaking for me. Number one, it can be very intimidating. I can remember the first time I'm sitting there. The President is at one end of the table, and I'm at the table, but I'm at the far end. And again, I'm not there for every issue. I'm there for several key issues, either in cyber or intelligence, supporting policy decisions in my NSA hat. So I'm the first to acknowledge it can be very intimidating. 

And I can remember thinking to myself, I am the grandson of a Welsh coal miner who went through Ellis Island. How did I wind up sitting here in the Sit Room, or in the Oval Office, talking to the President of the United States. And he's, like, what do you think about x, y, or z? I found that surreal. 

Secondly, it is much smaller than you think it is. Thirdly, it is not as advanced from an IT perspective as it should be. It's pretty cramped in there, when you get everybody in there. 

OK, thank you for that. 

There's actually--on the trivia side, there's actually three different situation rooms. They're different sizes. The big one is the one most often used, but it's not all that big. 

OK, and do you always get to sit at the table, or do they put you on the side seat sometimes? And-- 

I was there for--if I was there, I always sat at the table. I don't ever remember sitting in the outer ring. So to Joan's point, there's kind of a hierarchy. Junior people sit around the chairs on the outside of the room, the principals sit at the table. I don't remember being there where I wasn't at the table. 

I wasn't there all the time by any stretch of the imagination. 

Another one, coming in from Eric Blue--will India become our strongest ally against China? Well, we didn't talk about India at all. Do you have a few thoughts there? 

Right, so dealt with India very directly during in my career. I was the Director of Intelligence out of the Indo-Pacific command, spent a lot of time in New Delhi. India has always been a challenge. The US view had always been, hey, can we somehow create a formal alliance or relationship with them. And given India's non-alignment history, I don't think that's a realistic approach. Look at the Indian approach to the cross-border fighting that occurred last year. 

They didn't opt to internationalize it. They didn't opt to come to us or others to say, hey, you need to help us with the Chinese. They instead said, this is an issue we will deal with China. They want trade--they, the Indians, want trade relationships with the broader world. They like the idea of strategic coordination, but I think they are inherently--they, the Indians, are inherently skeptical of formal alliance structures with the US. 

And so my bottom line is, we have to be realistic with respect to India. It's always been the great white whale in some ways. Every administration thinks, I'm going to create this strategic relationship that's going to be the building block for a lot of other issues. And it just hasn't worked that way. 

But it is the largest democracy in the world, is it not? Wouldn't it be logical to think that they would be a great strategic partner for us? 

Well, I didn't say that we shouldn't view them as an attractive partner, but you have to be realistic. Given India's history, given India's view of the broader world around us, given the history of the region, it's just not going to be the same kind of relationship that we think of a NATO, or the UK, or France and Germany. I'm not trying in any way to lessen the importance of India. I'm just trying to be realistic about expectations. 

Good-- no, that's what we want to hear. This is coming in from Amy Manson. Can the Admiral comment on the key issues with Mexico and Latin America? What are the key issues in your mind there? 

Well I think twofold--immigration, clearly, because remember, those nations themselves want an immigration policy that they can build around themselves. This constant fluctuation of people moving back and forth, of people flowing from deeper in Latin America up to the north to try to get to the border, that's destabilizing if you're Mexico, if you're Costa Rica. For example, they have concerns about this. 

And the other issue is--really, the other issue I think that's the most important aside from immigration is the whole economic piece. Is there a way--if you're those economies in the South, you view the American market as one of your primary markets, whether it's  agriculture, fruit, and other products, whether it's manufacturing, whether it's technology work that you're doing in support of US companies for example, and other companies. 

I think, clearly, trade in the economic piece is the other area where they are really concerned. And lastly, from a US perspective, the other concern that we always had historically was the drug and the corruption issue, about how that just undermined their institutions and it made it very difficult to create long term relationships if the partner you're negotiating with, you believe is compromised and is being undermined by potential support or relationships with the cartels and the drug trade. 

And I'm not trying to argue every Southern hemisphere official is automatically aligned with the drug cartels, but you have to acknowledge the drug cartels are able to exert a significant level of influence. 

Has that got better or worse though? Has that gotten better or worse for the US? I mean, things-- 

I'd like to think that it's gotten better, but I'll be honest. I wonder if it's better, or if it's more a case--we have been so focused on other things, it just hasn't received the same level of insight and attention. And so we're not really as well informed. I don't know, honestly. 

Well--listen, folks. We are going to have to leave it at that. And I cannot thank you Admiral Rogers, enough, for joining us today. I will tell you I could go on. I'm sure you have other things to work on. But thank you so much--your expertise, your insight, your just candid comments for our audience--just gotten a ton of requests to have. So I'd like to extend an invitation for you to join us again on another webinar later this year if you're so inclined. 

Sure. 

But thank you so much for your service to our country and your time. Again, we appreciate it. 

Well, thank you for the opportunity, Joan. 

(DESCRIPTION) 
WEDNESDAYS WITH WOODWARD, A WEBINAR SERIES. Upcoming Webinars: February 10, iGen at Work: Understanding Risk-Taking, Motivation and More Across Generations. February 17, The Changing Landscape of Insurance Distribution. March 3, Crash and Learn: An Inside Look at the Insurance Institute for Highway Safety. March 17, Are You Recruiting Military Spouses Yet? travelers institute dot org. 

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Great. And folks, I also want to let you know about a couple of other upcoming webinars we have in the next four weeks. We're going to do a lot of them. February 10, we have a session with a leading professor on Gen Z, and how to work with our young folks in the workplace. Then on February 17, Patrick Kinney is going to join us, the head of distribution--enterprise distribution for Travelers, talking about the changing face of distribution in our industry. 

March 3, we're going to hear from the Insurance Institute for Highway Safety. And that session is going to be in crash and learn--learning about which are the safest cars on the road. And then, March 17--I think Admiral Rogers will agree with me--on a topic that we all care about, are you recruiting military spouses yet, which is just a rich population that we have hired a lot of, and want to share our insights and what we've learned about recruiting military spouses. 

So please join me for those. You can LinkedIn me, and go to our Traveler's Website, TravelersInstitute.org.  Again, Admiral Rogers thank you for your time and your service. And thank you all out there. Be safe, wear your mask, and we'll see you next Wednesday. 

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Replays Now Available: The Race to Distribute a COVID Vaccine. Weathering the Storm: A Behind-the-Scenes Look at the Insurance Institute for Business & Home Safety (I.B.H.S.). And many more.